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ABSTRACT 
This research determined the costs, benefits and efficiency of the Post 9/11 Era GI 
Bill Transferability benefit by simulating four different retention mechanisms and 
comparing the cost of each to provide desired retention levels among a population of 
sailors who valued the Transferability benefit more than or less than the Cost of 
Transferability to the Navy.  The mechanisms investigated were a purely monetary 
auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) Auction, and the Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  
All three mechanisms were simulated, data were analyzed and results were 
compared.  The CRAM clearly showed it was the most efficient method for meeting 
retention objectives while constraining Costs to the Navy as much as possible. Cost 
savings to the Navy ranged from 27% to 51% over Cash Only Selective Reenlistment 
Bonuses (SRB).   
Furthermore, this report confirms that an across-the-board benefit such as GI Bill 
Transferability significantly reduces the positive surplus when sailors who have a Value 
of Transferability less than the Cost of Transferability nonetheless exploit this benefit.   
Maintaining the status quo SRB policy combined with the estimated negative 
retention effects of the GI Bill Transferability benefit only magnifies the cost 
ineffectiveness of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND OF THE POST 9/11 ERA GI BILL 
1. Honoring a Promise from 1944 for Current and Future Veterans 
The Post World War II GI Bill provided veterans with enough funding to 
completely cover tuition costs, books, fees and housing.  The current Montgomery GI 
Bill (MGIB) only provides a veteran who completes at least 36 months of enlisted duty 
with a monthly check for $1,101 for 36 months.  This equates to $9,909 for a full nine 
month academic calendar year.1  Meanwhile, the average cost of tuition, fees and 
housing are $13,5892 per the same academic calendar year.  Obviously, there is a major 
gap between the intent of the Post World War II GI Bill and the current MG
In order to bridge this gap, a group of Senators3, both Republican and Democrat, 
introduced a totally overhauled version of the MGIB.  They called it the Post 9/11 Era GI 
Bill, which was signed into law on June 30, 2008.  This bill provides the same level of 
benefit that post World War II veterans had, plus a little bit more.  Post 9/11 Era veterans 
now have the ability to transfer their education benefits to spouses and dependent 
children.  Not only does this new GI Bill reaffirm the 1944 promise that the government 
made to military veterans, but it takes it a step further by recognizing that military 
families also make sacrifices for their country.   
2. Concerns of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill 
As great as the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill is expected to be, it does have some 
underlying issues.  The most significant being the additional cost associated with the new 
transferability benefit.  It will be quite a while until the economic impact of this GI Bill is 
felt.  Even though it is impossible to accurately determine future monetary costs, 
institutions such as the Board of Actuaries (BoA) and the Congressional Budget Office 
 
1 Academic Calendar Year 2006. 
2 The College Board, Trends in College Pricing 2007, 6, October 2007. 
3 Senator Jim Webb (D–VA), Senator Frank Lautenberg (D–NJ), Senator Chuck Hagel (R–NE) and 
Senator John Warner (R–VA). 
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(CBO) have provided estimates that are based on logical4 assumptions.  These estimates 
are currently being used to aid in planning future budgetary guidelines for the different 
services.   
Another type of cost, first term attrition, is of great concern as well.  As history 
has shown, any significant increase in educational benefits tends to lead toward a higher 
attrition rate for first term enlisted personnel.  Additionally, the experience of the career 
force5 tends to have a significant decline.  To offset these negative impacts, services have 
to exert more pressure on the recruiting market and boost Selective Reenlistment Bonuses 
(SRB) for individuals in critically undermanned occupations.   
Finally, unintended consequences are always a concern.  Though this phrase tends 
to have a negative overture, it is not necessarily bad.  Could the Post 9/11 GI Bill foster a 
new sense of patriotism and commitment among American youth for this generous 
benefit?  Could it inspire more and more American youth to enlist and then leave the 
military at the first opportune moment to take advantage of this generous benefit?  Could 
it inspire more and more American young adults to view the military as a means of 
establishing a secure lifestyle for a family and a means to pay for their children’s 
education?  The answers to these types of questions are the unintended consequences that 
may or may not be negative in nature.   
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE POST 9/11 ERA 
GI BILL 
1. Primary Objective 
The primary objective of this study is to determine the cost-effectiveness of the 
Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability clause as a force-shaping tool.  Though costs are 
impossible to forecast in an accurate manner, using mathematical models that include 
logical assumptions concerning usage rates and enlistment/reenlistment rates can provide 
a reasonable picture for decision makers of the costs that could possibly be expected.  
 
4 Assumptions include expected member usage rates, expected dependent usage rates, etc... (See pgs. 
30–31 of Literature Review Section). 
5 Enlisted Personnel with more than 4 years of active duty service and are beyond their initial term of 
enlistment.   
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Cost estimates provided in the literature will be combined with values expressed in an 
enlisted retention survey to determine the cost-effectiveness of the GI Bill Transferability 
provision as a force-shaping tool. 
2. Secondary Objectives 
The second objective of this study is to determine the return on investment (ROI) 
of this educational benefit.  Will this new GI Bill Transferability provision allow the 
services to buck the trend that previous significant educational benefit increases have 
done or will it follow historical evidence?  Will the new GI Bill reveal benefits that no 
one expected?   
The third and final objective of this thesis is to determine if the Post 9/11 Era GI 
Bill is in fact logical; in other words, is it fiscally responsible?  If it is not fiscally 
responsible, is it an inefficient use of taxpayer money?  An important factor in 
determining its efficiency is retention rate.  If this new educational benefit significantly 
decreases the career force, then could it be considered inefficient?  By examining the 
current literature, policymaker’s educational benefit guidance, current military personnel 
actions and predicted future military personnel actions, this analysis will analyze the 
costs, benefits and efficiency of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill.     
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis analyzes survey data regarding GI Bill Transferability to determine 
whether or not it is a cost efficient retention incentive.  The Enlisted Retention Survey 
(ERS) conducted by LT Brooke Zimmerman is the primary data source for the analysis 
since it focuses on enlisted sailors who are currently eligible for Selective Reenlistment 
Bonuses (SRBs) and GI Bill Transferability.  Additionally, this thesis does not 
specifically address other military services, yet the findings may be applicable to any 
enlisted pay grade.  
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is an extension of the continuing research being conducted by Dr. Pete 
Coughlan and Dr. Bill Gates.  The overarching focus of that research explores the cost-
 4
effectiveness of combining monetary and non-monetary retention incentives (i.e., flexible 
benefit packages) for active duty enlisted personnel.   
The research contained within this study merely tries to examine one aspect of 
their research; the cost efficiency of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability benefit.  
Currently there are very few studies on the subject of transferability, however, cost 
estimates on a per capita basis have been provided by some government agencies that 
will allow the simulation of GI Bill Transferability cost effectiveness.  Key questions to 
be answered are: 
 What monetary and non-monetary incentives (NMI) do sailors in the 
Enlisted Retention Survey value?  What is the cost per capita of GI Bill 
Transferability?  How much does the surveyed population value GI Bill 
Transferability?  Does the majority of the targeted enlisted population 
value GI Bill Transferability more than the estimated Costs of 
Transferability?  (Chapter II) 
 Have previous traditional SRB mechanisms been efficient and cost 
effective?  Do alternative mechanisms such as auctions offer the same, if 
not better, result as traditional Cash Only SRBs?  (Chapter III)  
 Which of the cost per person estimations provide the most accurate 
inference of Cost to the Navy for the enlisted population in the Enlisted 
Retention Survey?  Do the alternative retention mechanisms such as the 
CRAM and Adjusted SRBs prove to be cost effective and fiscally 
efficient? (Chapter IV) 
Chapter IV also provides the simulation results and findings of the four 
different retention mechanisms as well.  Chapter V presents the conclusions and 
recommendations.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF VETERANS EDUCATIONAL 
BENEFITS 
1. Intent of Previous Veterans Educational Benefits 
The 1944 Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill) has been considered to be one 
of the most significant pieces of legislation to ever be passed.  Since its inception in June 
1944, the GI Bill has gone through several changes.  From a national perspective, the GI 
Bill was intended to help the country avoid slipping back into a depression and prevent a 
similar situation like the Bonus March of 1932.6  In other words, the GI Bill was nothing 
more than compensation to WWI and WWII veterans for wartime services.  A different 
point of view by which to examine the intentions of the GI Bill was through the Navy’s 
eyes.  The Navy saw the GI Bill as an excellent recruiting tool for high quality sailors.  
By increasing the number of high quality recruits, the Navy gained a highly exceptional 
force that would establish supremacy of the sea in both wartime and peacetime.  From the 
individual sailor’s point of view, this provided an opportunity to attend a college or 
university that he/she might not otherwise have been able to attend.  Gaining an 
education, increasing their quality of life and enhancing their marketability in the civilian 
labor market in exchange for four years of duty was deemed a deal too good to pass up 
for many individuals.   
However, when the All Volunteer Force (AVF) was conceived in 1973, a 
momentous modification to the GI Bill [MGIB] provided the service member with an 
$1101 monthly stipend for 36 months as long as he/she voluntarily invested $100 per 
month for the first 12 months of their initial enlistment and maintained a full course load 
per semester.  The MGIB was worth approximately $40,000 during this time.  
Meanwhile, veterans’ educational benefits were unwittingly transformed from a service 
compensation award and re-assimilation program into a high-powered recruiting tool, 
changing its original meaning.   
 
6 WWI veteran’s march in Washington D.C. demanding a cash payment of Service Certificates granted 
to them eight years earlier via the Adjusted Service Certificate Law of 1924. 
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After several decades of inflation, escalating college costs and stagnation of 
veterans’ education benefits, Senator Jim Webb and his constituents were able to magnify 
the value of the MGIB (aka Post 9/11 Era GI Bill) to approximately $80,000 as well as 
providing the capacity to transfer this benefit to spouses or dependents (Wisnoski).  
Intending to truly honor today’s veterans, as with the original GI Bill in 1944, the Post 9-
11 Era GI Bill will do just that.  It will provide the means for veterans, as well as their 
dependents, to increase the quality of their life through higher education.   
2. Previous GI Bill Costs and Benefits 
a. Monetary 
1944 GI Bill of Rights To put the predicted costs and benefits of the 
Post 9/11 GI Bill in context, we need a retrospective view of the GI Bill.  Veterans’ 
education benefits have evolved over the last six decades.  Initially, the GI Bill of Rights 
of 1944 was completely subsidized by the federal government [Veterans Administration] 
and payments of up to $500 annually were issued directly to the particular higher 
education institution attended by the WWI or WWII veteran.  In addition, separate 
subsistence payments, $50/month for single vets and more for vets with dependents, were 
provided to the veteran to help cover the daily cost of living (Smole, 3).  The GI Bill of 
Rights ended on July 25, 1956.  
 $50 (1944) ≈ $589 (2007 constant dollars7) 
 $500 (1944) ≈ $5,890 (2007 constant dollars) 
 Total Annual Cost $1,100 (1944)≈$12,958 (2007 constant dollars) 
1952 Korean GI Bill In 1952, the Korean GI Bill8 was authorized by 
Congress to help vets readjust to civilian life after their time in the Korean War.  The 
Korean GI Bill was worth $110 monthly for single sailors and more for sailors who had 
dependents.  However, the monthly benefit was intended to cover the costs of both higher 
 
7 2007 constant dollars are calculated using  CPI inflation calculator with respective base years and 
2007 for the current year 
8 Veterans’ Readjustment Act of 1952 and successor to the GI Bill of Rights 
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education and subsistence.  Funds were paid directly to the veteran.  The reasoning for 
this method was to reduce fraud committed by Institutes of Higher Education (IHE) as 
well as encourage more responsible spending by veterans, because they would have to 
partially cover the cost of learning.  The program ended January 31, 1965.   
 $110 (1965) ≈  $724 (2007) 
 Total Annual Cost $1,320 (1965) ≈ $8,688 (2007 constant dollars) 
1966 Post-Korea & Vietnam Era GI Bill In 1966, the Post-Korea and 
Vietnam Era GI Bill9 was originally intended for Korean War era veterans and was not 
supposed to be as generous as the earlier veterans education assistance programs (Smole, 
3).  This was the first GI Bill that provided benefits to vets who were still on active duty 
as opposed to previous GI Bills that required vets to complete their time in service.  At 
the same time, it decreased monthly benefits to $100 for single vets; those with 
dependents were awarded a little more. Eventually, after numerous increases over a span 
of 18 years, the monthly benefits maxed out at $376 per month in 1984.  In addition, the 
total number of monthly payments for which vets were eligible under this program 
equaled the number of months on active duty status.  This program ended December 31, 
1989.  
 $100 (1966) ≈  $640 (2007) 
 Total Annual Cost $1,200 (1966) ≈ $7,680 (2007 constant dollars) 
 $376 (1984) ≈ $629 (2007) 
 Total Annual Cost $4,512 (1984) ≈ $7,548 (2007 constant dollars) 
1976 VEAP In 1976, the Post Vietnam Era Veterans Education 
Assistance Program (VEAP) was established and made available to service members who 
entered active duty after December 31, 1976 and before July 1, 1985.  Addressing a 
specific goal, VEAP was to be the first major recruiting tool by the services since the 
military became an AVF.  Due to the requirement that participants had to contribute 
 
9 Veterans Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966 
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anywhere from $25 to $100 maximum per month with the government matching 
contributions on a 1-for-2 basis, the maximum available monthly educational benefit was 
$300. 
 $300 (1977) ≈  $1,026 (2007) 
 Total Annual Benefit $3,600 (1977)≈ $12,312 (2007 constant 
dollars) 
1985 MGIB The Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) replaced VEAP on June 
30, 1985.  The MGIB included two major programs: MGIB-Active Duty (MGIB-AD) 
and MGIB-Selected Reserve (MGIB-SR).  Certain MGIB-AD participants also have the 
option to receive additional benefits called “kickers10” or “college fund”.  This analysis 
will focus on MGIB-AD (less kickers or college fund) only and will be referred to as 
simply “MGIB”.  To be eligible to participate in MGIB, service members must have had 
their first 12 months pay reduced by $100 for each month, have a high school 
diploma/GED, an honorable discharge or active duty and completion of at least 12 credit 
hours towards a college degree.  Participants only have 36 months of total MGIB benefits 
and a maximum of 10 years to exercise these benefits.   
Monthly benefits vary based on time in service and class load.  This 
analysis focuses on vets who have at least three continuous years on active duty and are 
enrolled as full-time11 students.  Service members who fall under this category currently 
receive a maximum of $1,321.00 per month regardless of dependents status (Veterans 
Administration, 1Aug08).   
 $300 (1985) ≈  $578 (2007) 
 Total Annual Benefit $3,600 (1985) ≈ $6,936 (2007 constant 
dollars) 
 $1,272 (2007) 
 
10 Educational benefits, in addition to the MGIB, which are used as incentives to recruit high quality 
recruits into critically undermanned occupations. 
11 12 Credit hours per semester. 
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 Total Annual Benefit $15,852 (2008)≈$15,264 (2007 constant 
dollars) 
b. Secondary Navy Benefits 
From the Navy’s perspective, previous GI Bills provided the government 
with unintended costs and benefits that were difficult, if not impossible, to measure.  
Even though non-monetary benefits are intangible in nature, it is believed by an 
overwhelming majority of business professionals, as well as academia, that factors such 
as job satisfaction, employer appreciation of employees, pride in service, etc..., are 
extremely significant factors that affect production and quality.  For example, the 1944 
GI Bill of Rights created an atmosphere among returning GI’s that the U.S. government 
and the citizens of the U.S. were indeed grateful for their service and sacrifice.  Due to 
the overwhelming public support for providing veterans with educational assistance, 
unintended consequences (i.e., benefits), including massive expansions in college 
enrollment, veteran participation in educational assistance and increased quality of the 
workforce, aided the country in avoiding a widely feared post-WWII depression. 
B. MOTIVATING FACTORS OF CHANGE 
For the past three decades, veterans’ educational benefits have been the most 
powerful recruiting tool for the armed forces.  Educational benefits are designed to 
persuade 17-19 year old men and women to enlist as members of the armed forces.  
There are many reasons for recruiting young adults, including acquiring individuals to 
man duty posts, provide guard support, and maintain a supply of infantrymen and repair 
ships’ equipment.  However, two of the most significant reasons to offer educational 
benefits are to incentivize highly qualified individuals to enlist in technologically 
advanced rates that are difficult to fill and enticing high quality individuals to stay in 
military service past their first enlistment.  Currently, the preferred method of keeping 
high quality sailors in the Navy is to reward them with a sufficiently high Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB).  Initially, monetary lump sums were very enticing and 
seemed like a logical response to the majority of preferences that sailors desired outside 
of the workplace.  Nonetheless, SRBs have proven to be inefficient use of funds and 
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misunderstanding the current sailor’s underlying motivational/decisional factors, such as 
a spouse’s desire for the service member to remain on active duty.     
“Between 1980 and 2000, at least half of the active duty force consisted of 
married service members” (Wisnoski, 2005, 5).  Associated with this were “increased 
familial responsibilities” as well as spousal desires to obtain an education (GAO-02-
557T).    According to Government Accounting Office (GAO), service members with 
children increased from 43 percent to 45 percent between 1990 and 2000 (Wisnoski, 
2005, 5).  By understanding the demographic changes of our active duty forces, 
researchers can identify, define and determine what incentives are truly important to 
military personnel and their spouses.  Steven Wisnoski writes, “When determining what 
influences spouses’ opinions toward the retention of the significant other, their own 
employment and educational opportunities tend to be a major contributor”. 
Wisnoski’s thesis clearly identifies that higher educational opportunities for 
family members [dependents] is a non-monetary incentive that holds a much higher value 
than simple lump sums of cash for service members who have dependents.    In addition, 
the opportunity to earn a college degree while one’s spouse remains on active duty has 
consistently been cited as a determinant of overall satisfaction with military life (aka: 
Quality of Life / QOL).  Even though this aspect is difficult to analyze in quantitative 
terms, Wisnoski was able to create variables that in fact show a correlation between 
overall military life satisfaction, a spouse’s desire for a college education and the 
spouse’s desire for the service member to remain on active duty.  After a logistical 
regression analysis, Wisnoski showed that military QOL was more often than not 
positively correlated with spousal educational opportunities. 
1. 2004 Rand Corporation Study  
In contrast, Wisnoski (2007) observes that a 2004 Rand Corporation Study 
reported that spousal education opportunities had been hindered by numerous factors 
(Wisnoski, 2005, 7).  Examples of these factors include frequent duty relocations as well 
as the inflexibility and unpredictability of the service member’s work schedule.  Since the 
majority of duty station assignments tend to last three years, a spouse, under ideal 
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conditions for child care and tuition assistance, could only complete three years of 
schooling before having to transfer to another duty location.  In addition, the majority of 
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) orders requires state-to-state relocation or even 
transfer to another country, therefore student/spouses must retake many courses because 
courses don’t always transfer from one college to another.  
Even though educational benefits affect how a military spouse perceives their 
QOL and their desire for the active duty member to reenlist, it is the administration of 
educational benefit policies that determine whether or not educational benefits have a 
positive or negative impact on retention.  Therefore, a spouse’s perception about their 
own personal educational opportunities seems critical.  The challenge at this point is to 
quantify how much transferring a service member’s educational benefit to dependents is 
worth to that particular individual.   
Wisnoski’s thesis concludes that service members are encouraged to reenlist when 
spouses feel their personal educational opportunities are better as military spouses.  In 
addition, Wisnoski’s thesis concludes that the ability to transfer GI Bill benefits to one’s 
spouse or other dependents in exchange for an additional enlistment term could prove 
beneficial in the recruiting and retention process.  
2. American Legion 
Another motivating factor, educational costs beyond tuition, was brought to the 
public attention by the American Legion.  In the August 2008 edition of the American 
Legion Magazine, writer Phillip Callaghan stated that “[education] benefits were failing 
to cover the cost of tuition” (Callaghan, 2008).  This statement not only reflects the 
obvious tuition costs, but the additional costs of attending college that remain 
unaccounted for by legislation concerning veterans’ educational benefits.  Through 
numerous interviews, Callaghan discovered that the majority of his participants’ 
comments centered on personal situations that involve living with a parent, or other 
family member while in school, to cover the cost of rent, food and other miscellaneous 
items (i.e., hygiene products, clothing).  Additional costs, such as transportation to  
 
 12
and from school, books and parking permits are all costs that affect the majority of 
college students, as well, yet remain unaccounted for when making decisions about 
educational benefits.   
The implicit policy to only cover tuition costs for universities that are reasonably 
affordable is the third motivational factor to change the GI Bill.  Many veterans may want 
to attend a prestigious university (i.e., Harvard, Yale, Penn State).  Callaghan (2008) 
maintains that the reasons for the preference are irrelevant and it is not the role of the 
U.S. government to dictate which university a veteran can attend, but rather a 
responsibility to empower a veteran to choose which university is best for him or her.  
Before passing the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill, many veterans incurred huge student loans to 
attend the best universities.  Case in point, Aaron Alfson (USAF), Iraq and Afghanistan 
veteran, has a debt of $90,000 and is only in his third year of college at Columbia 
University (Callaghan, 2008).  The skyrocketing costs of college tuition are increasing 
exponentially beyond the previous veterans’ educational benefits.  Therefore, many 
veterans were being forced to choose between attending a cheaper, second tier public 
university or incurring tens of thousands of dollars of student loan debt.   
3. Army Family Action Plan (AFAP) 
The fourth motivational factor to improve educational benefits was feedback 
received from the Army Family Action Plan (AFAP) organization which advises 
Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) regarding issues such as family 
education benefits.  After numerous surveys spanning several years, AFAP noticed that 
MGIB Transferability has always been a Top 5 issue.  Therefore, they have consistently 
strongly recommended that HQDA include transferability of education benefits to 
spouses as well as children (Conway, 2007).   
4. Army Transferability Pilot Program 
In response to soldiers’ desires to provide their dependents the means for higher 
education, the Army developed a pilot program and “implemented transferability in July 
2006 for transfer of benefits to spouses only” via authorization under Title 38, U.S. Code, 
Chapter 30, Public law 107-107 (Conway, 2007).  They further limited this transferability 
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option to Soldiers in critical skills, as determined by the Secretary of the Army; MGIB 
benefits are only transferable to spouses to enhance recruiting and retention for critical 
skills.  Soldiers also had to be entitled to a Zone B (6-10 year mid careerist) or Zone C 
(10-14 year careerist) bonus.  In addition, the Army was now responsible for funding this 
program, as opposed to the Veterans Administration (VA).  They secured their funding 
requirements by giving the soldier a choice between a full SRB or a slightly reduced SRB 
with the ability to transfer over $19,000 in benefits to a spouse.  As will be detailed later, 
the Army estimated the per user cost of the transferability option in FY08 at 
approximately $3,100 per soldier.   
Initially, the program had roughly 250 soldier participants who were mid-
careerists.  Of those 250, the majority were assigned to Forces Command and U.S. 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM).  Ninety six percent of the soldiers elected 
transferability when they reenlisted.  Of the 96%, only 65% used a portion of their 
benefits for personal education goals, totaling 12-14 months worth of assistance on 
average (Conway, 2007).   
5. 2008 DMDC Quick Compass of Active Duty Members Poll 
In 2008, results of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Quick Compass 
of Active Duty Members (all services) survey were officially released.  It included 9,290 
eligible respondents out of 41,027 surveyed [26%].  The results of Enlisted Navy 
Personnel only are presented here in Table 1 and Table 2 due to the focus of this thesis.  
The actual survey results, which contain information pertinent to all other military 











EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS       
Enrolled in MGIB  86 91 84 
GI Bill Usage 
Yes; Currently 
Using the Benefit 1 1 1 
 14
  
No; but Plan to 
use the benefit 91 98 86 
Being able to x-fer benefits
to dependents Important 88 87 89 
  Not important 4 3 4 
Being able to use GI Bill benefit
to pay existing college loans Important 69 72 68 
  Not important 16 14 18 
When would you use a benefit to
cover a monthly cost-of-living
stipend and full tuition? 
 
Exit military at 
earliest chance to




separation 67 59 72 
PERCEPTION OF NEW GI BILL       
Importance of x-fer to spouse Important 77 81 74 
  Not important 7 6 7 
Importance of x-fer to children Important 92 91 92 
  Not important 3 2 4 
Likelihood to x-fer some/all
of MGIB to spouse Likely 75 76 75 
  Unlikely 13 13 12 
Likelihood to x-fer some/all
of MGIB to children Likely 94 92 94 
  Unlikely 2 NR 2 
Members should be allowed to
x-fer entire GI Bill to dependents Agree 89 86 90 
  Disagree 3 4 2 
How likely would you be to STAY
to be eligible to x-fer MGIB to 
dependents Likely 67 54 72 
  Unlikely 18 26 15 
RETENTION AND THE NEW GI BILL       
Degree likely to stay on active
duty for new MGIB x-fer benefit Large Extent 69 61 74 
  Not at all 9 9 9 
Degree likely to stay on active
duty for new MGIB existing
college loan repayment benefit Large Extent 51 50 51 
  Not at all 20 18 21 
Table 1.   2008 DMDC Quick Compass of Active Duty Members Poll (Navy 
Enlisted Personnel Only) (continued) 
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Table 1 provides a good synopsis of surveyed enlisted naval personnel’s overall 
knowledge of educational benefits, perceptions of the new GI Bill and retention 
intentions when the new GI Bill is factored in.   
a. Educational Benefits 
According to the survey, a vast majority of enlisted personnel have elected 
to enroll in the MGIB for a cost of $100 dollars per month, yet only one percent of those 
enrolled are currently using the benefit.  The most likely reason for such a low usage rate 
is tuition assistance (TA).  Since TA covers the majority (75%) of active duty members 
tuition costs, the remaining costs are usually covered by the TOP-UP12 program or 
directly out-of-pocket.  There are various reasons for choosing one or the other methods 
to pay for the remaining 25% of tuition costs, but experience and observation tend to lean 
toward the fact that many sailors want to save their MGIB benefits for school after they 
have separated/retired from the military.  The value of a monthly stipend and tuition 
coverage are essential for prior service members who are going back to school and do not 
want to waste any of the available 36 months of MGIB benefits on tuition that can be 
covered by TA while on active duty. 
Another important finding of the DMDC survey revealed that the majority 
of Navy E1-E4 respondents (59%) would use their GI Bill monthly living stipend and full 
tuition coverage only after retiring or separating later in their career as opposed to the 
22% who stated they would “exit the military at the earliest chance to use the benefit” 
(DMDC).  These findings lend supporting evidence to the critics of the Post 9/11 Era GI 
Bill who believe that most junior enlisted personnel will not ‘stay Navy’ to exploit the 
generous education benefits being offered.   
b. Perception of New GI Bill 
Enlisted Navy respondents perceive the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill 
Transferability clause as extremely important.  Both junior and senior sailors 
overwhelmingly stated that transferability of educational benefits is important and that 
 
12 TOP–UP is an educational assistance program in which active duty service members can use part of 
their MGIB benefits to cover the remaining tuition costs not covered by TA. 
 16
tively.   
                                                
they would most likely transfer those benefits to dependents.  Even though many of these 
junior sailor respondents may not necessarily be married or have children, they 
apparently see the value of such a benefit.  Observing the value they have for 
transferability logically foretells that this particular benefit will most likely have some 
impact on whether or not these junior sailors will reenlist.  In fact, this survey shows that 
of all the Navy E1-E4 personnel who participated, 54% are likely to ‘stay’ Navy to 
become eligible to transfer benefits to dependents, a 10 year commitment in most 
cases.13  Only 26% of the sailors in the same category replied nega
c. Retention and the New GI Bill 
The final focus of the DMDC survey highlights that the preponderance of 
all enlisted sailors in this survey are likely to remain in the service in exchange for 
proposed new MGIB benefits such, as transferability and existing college loan 
repayment; 69% of the enlisted Navy personnel would stay on active duty for the 
transferability option whereas only nine percent would not.  This statistic, as well as the 
rest of the survey, suggests that this research take the next step in this analysis and 
compare the DMDC results with those of the Enlisted Retention Survey.   The product of 
that comparison will be revealed in greater detail in Chapter IV.   
C. INITIAL DOD GUIDANCE 
1. Expanded Army Pilot Program 
After the experience of the Army’s initial 2006 educational benefit transferability 
program, they decided to broaden it and change it into the Expanded Army Pilot 
Program.  The expanded program came into effect on November 1, 2007 and included 
not only spouses but dependent children as well.  According to the program’s Procedures 
and Guidance, only “Eligible Military Occupational Specialties (MOS)” were allowed to 
 
13 On June 23, 2009, the DoD announced the rules for Post 9/11 GI Bill Transferability.  Eligible 
career service members in the Active Component or Selected Reserve on August 1, 2009 who have served 
at least six years, and who commit to serve four more years, may elect to transfer all or part of their post 
9/11 education benefits to a dependent spouse and/or children.  Service members with 10 or more years of 
service who by DoD or Service policy are prevented from serving four years may be eligible for 
transferability if they commit to serve the maximum amount of time allowed by the policy or law.  
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participate in the program.  The requisites for participation in the program meant that 
“Soldiers must be currently serving in and reenlist (minimum of 4 years) in one of the 
MOSs identified in the current Regular Army Active Component Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus (SRB) Program” (Army, 2007).  Those that are eligible for the MOS specific SRB 
must also be in a Zone B or Zone C bonus category. 
The second program requirement is that “all eligible Soldiers desiring to 
participate in the program must complete a DD Form 2366-2 (see Figure 1), Montgomery 
GI Bill Act of 1984 (MGIB) Transferability Program.  This applies even in cases where a 
dependent is not designated at the time of reenlistment to receive benefits” (Army, 2007).  
The form serves as an election form and proof of program participation.  The completed 
DD Form 2236 can be verified by viewing the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) 
online at the Army Knowledge Online website at https://www.us.army.mil.  The program 
guidance goes on to state that, “the program is bound by law to retention of  critical skills 
in which soldiers must elect to participate at the time of reenlistment, and must reenlist 
for a minimum of 4 years.  Soldiers who don’t select the MGIB Transferability option at 
the time of reenlistment will not be eligible to participate in the program until a 
subsequent reenlistment period” (Army, 2007).    
Under the Expanded Army Pilot Program, the benefit was defined as “the ability 
to transfer up to 18 months of unused Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) benefits to an eligible 
dependent.  A dependent to which the entitlement is transferred may not begin using the 
entitlement until: 
Spouse:  “By law, the Soldier has completed at least six years of service in 
the Armed Forces.” (Army, 2007) 
Child:  By law, the Soldier has completed at least 10 years of service in 
the Armed Forces, and either: the completion by the child of the 
requirement of a secondary school diploma (or equivalency certificate); or 
the attainment by the child of 18 years of age” (Army, 2007).   
  18
Figure 1.   DD Form 2236-2 (From Army, 2007) 
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In addition to eligible dependents, the following eligibility requirements and 
procedures must have been satisfied: 
 “Enrolled in the MGIB upon initial entry to active duty and paid 
the $1,200 for MGIB enrollment.  (Not eligible are Vietnam Era-
Rollover, VEAP conversion, and Involuntary Separation).”  (Army 
2007) 
 “Completed at least 6 years of service in the Armed Forces at the 
time of reenlistment.”  (Army 2007) 
 “Reenlist for a period of at least 4 years and complete items 1 and 
2 of DD Form 2366-2 with the serving Army Retention Career 
Counselor.”  (Army 2007) 
 “Currently entitled to a MOS Specific Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus (SRB) and entitled to a Zone B or Zone C bonus at the time 
of reenlistment.”  (Army, 2007) 
D. COSTS  
1. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
On May 5, 2008, Senator Judd Gregg requested the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) to provide information about the cost of S.22 (The Post 9/11 Veterans Educational 
Assistance Act of 2008) and asked them to include its impact on military retention (CBO, 
2008).  In preparing their report, they “reviewed numerous versions of the bill and the 
most recently modified version by Senator Jim Webb’s Office on April 23, 2008” (CBO, 
2008).  After a thorough analysis, CBO produced a preliminary estimate of the 
mandatory and discretionary costs.   
According to the CBO preliminary costs, S.22 would do several things: 
 increase the amount of the education benefit available to veterans and to active-
duty and reserve service members 
 expand the number of individuals eligible to receive such benefits 
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 increase the period of time during which such benefits could be used 
 allow benefits to be used to cover an expanded array of education-related 
expenses (i.e., existing students loans, fees) 
 increase direct spending for veterans’ and reservists’ education benefit by $51.8 
billion over the 2008-2018 period (see Table 1) 
The impact of S.22 would affect recruitment and retention in offsetting ways.  
Discretionary costs related to recruitment and retention would show an “increase of $1.1 
billion over the 2009-2013 periods” (CBO, 2008).  Enhanced educational benefits make 
military service more appealing for initial enlistments and first term reenlistments; so 
other enlistment incentives can be reduced while still enlisting the same number of 
recruits.  The estimated savings for enlistment bonuses and other recruiting costs is $5.6 
billion (CBO, 2008).   
Because increased educational benefits would reduce the costs of college 
attendance after military service, the sheer number of service members that would 
separate will undoubtedly increase causing reenlistment incentives to swell to maintain 
appropriate reenlistment levels and appropriate experience profiles of the different 
services.  According to CBO estimates, every $10,000 increase in educational benefits 
yields a reduction in retention of slightly more than 1 percentage point.  CBO estimates 
that “S. 22 would more than double the present value of educational benefits for service 
members at the first reenlistment point—from about $40,000 to over $90,000—implying 
a 6 percent decline in the reenlistment rate, from about 42 percent to about 36 percent” 
(CBO, 2008).  Additional CBO estimates reveal that an $8,000 bonus to personnel at 
their first reenlistment point increases reenlistments by approximately 2 percentage 
points.  Therefore, an increase in SRBs of about $25,000 (≈ $8,000 x 3) per service 
member for first-term reenlistments would be required to “offset the expected effects on 
retention” of increased educational benefits.  To offset the combined effects would 
require an increase in total SRB payments of $6.7 billion, for a net increase in cost of 
$1.1 billion. 
2. Hogan and Mackin 
In addition to the CBO report, Paul F. Hogan and Patrick Mackin conducted a 
study on the recruiting and retention implications of proposed increases in the MGIB 
basic benefit (monthly stipend).  Their study, which coincided with the CBO report, 
stated that “Although education incentives increase the ability to attract high-quality 
recruits, they also reduce retention as those attracted into the services in response to the 
education benefit leave to make efficient use of those benefits.  Hence, the basic benefit 
offered across the board to all recruits must balance the recruiting effects with negative 
retention effects” (Hogan).  Furthermore, they proposed that the current monthly basic 
benefit of $1,101 be increased to $1,450.14  This would enable the services to preserve 
their purchasing power and still use kickers such as College Funds to channel high 
quality recruits into critically under-manned ratings.  The present value of the current 
MGIB, Hogan & Mackin’s $1,450 monthly stipend proposal and the S. 22 proposal are 
shown here in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2.   Present Value of Alternative Education Benefit Incentives (From Hogan & 
Mackin) 
                                                 
14 An estimate used by Hogan & Mackin in which they determined the equivalent cost of education at 
public universities.  Costs include tuition, fees and living expenses.  Additionally, $1,450 for 36 months 
should enable the services to preserve their ability to channel high quality recruits to specific occupations. 
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An added feature that Figure 2 implies is that “across-the-board basic benefits,” 
like the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill can incur risks; those who enter the military for the 
educational benefit may also leave the military at the first opportunity to take advantage 
of those education benefits.  What is left is an ‘experience vacuum’ where experienced 
Non-commissioned Officers (NCO) and Petty Officers (PO) leave the military en mass, 
inadvertently exerting tremendous pressure on recruiting to replace the members who 
left.   
Furthermore, Hogan and Mackin reveal the inability of the services to “channel 
recruits to where they are needed most” (Hogan).  Because all service members are 
eligible for the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill, there is no discretion within the services to 
differentially sway high quality recruits to critically undermanned rates/MOSs via 
enhanced educational benefits, such as the Navy College Fund or the Army College Fund 
(i.e., kickers).  In essence, a large increase to the current MGIB “may indeed improve 
overall recruiting, but may be an inefficient way to increase high quality recruits” in the 
services (Hogan).   
To validate their recruiting and retention effects estimation, Hogan and Mackin 
used a model to approximate the effects of changes in educational benefits with respect to 
the current MGIB.  These estimates are presented as elasticities in the following table:  
Service 
Parameter Army Navy USAF USMC 
Enlistment Pay Elasticity 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Education Benefit Enlistment Elasticity 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 
Education Benefit Retention Effect15 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Education Benefit Attrition Effect 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
SRB Effect16 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 
Marginal Cost of HQ recruit using EB17 $80,000 $80,000 $80,000 $80,000 
Table 2.  
                                                
 Parameters Used in Estimating Effects (From Hogan & Mackin) 
 
15 Effect is the percentage point change in the underlying rate for a $1,000 change in the 
Present Value of the educational benefit. 
16 Effect is the percentage point change in the underlying rate for a unit change in the 
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) multiplier. 
17 A baseline cost relative to the current MGIB used to establish effects of enhanced basic benefits. 
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The behavior of this particular model enables one to “predict how changes in pay 
and benefits will affect the probability that individuals will enlist or reenlist in the 
military” (Hogan).  For instance, an elasticity of .08 for ‘Education Benefit Enlistment 
Elasticity’ indicates that a 10% increase in the current MGIB will result in a 0.8% 
increase in high quality recruits, ceteris peribus. Empirical research conducted by Hogan 
and Mackin established the parameters involving recruiting and retention.18   
Given the estimates of the model and the projected inefficiency of the Post 9/11 
Era GI Bill, the long term effect of a larger basic benefit will only lower first term 
retention.  “This occurs as many of those who were attracted into the Service because of 
education benefits leave at the first term reenlistment point in order to use them” 
(Hogan).  To better illustrate the effects of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill, as well as the 
alternative proposed by Hogan and Mackin, refer to Table 3: 
 
 
18 “The estimate effect of education benefits on retention comes from Paul F. Hogan, D. Alton Smith 
and Stephen D. Sylvester (1991), “The Army College Fund: Effects on Attrition, Reenlistment, and Cost” 
in Curtis L. Gilroy, David K. Horne and D. Alton Smith, eds. Military Compensation and Personnel 
Retention: Models and Evidence.   Estimates of the effects of changes in pay on first–term retention were 
derived from Patrick C. Mackin, Christopher D. Mackie and Kimberly L. Darling (1996), Re–estimation of 
ACOL Coefficients for the CAPM Model: Final Report.  Estimates of the effects of changes in pay and 
economic conditions on the supply of enlistees were derived from recent empirical literature, as 
summarized in a RAND study by Michael P. Murray and Laurie L. McDonald (1999), Recent Recruiting 





Post 9/11 ERA GI 
Bill 
Army 
HQ Recruits +1.1% +5.9% 
Career Force -1.4% -4.5% 
Accessions +1.1% +2.9% 
Navy 
HQ Recruits +2.0% +8.1% 
Career Force -1.9% -6.3% 
Accessions +1.1% +3.4% 
USAF 
HQ Recruits +2.8% +10.2% 
Career Force -1.7% -6.4% 
Accessions +1.7% +6.9% 
USMC 
HQ Recruits +2.0% +8.1% 
Career Force -4.3% -15.6% 
Accessions +2.2% +8.4% 
Table 3.  
                                                
 Force Effects of Alternatives (From Hogan) 
The short term and long term effects of Cost Proposal $1,450 and the Post 9/11 
Era GI Bill are presented here.  Short term effects can be seen in the projected increases 
in ‘High Quality (HQ) Recruits’.  The Army has the smallest increase in HQ recruits with 
respect to the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill due to the loss of kickers whereas the Air Force has 
the greatest increase.  The Air Force has the lowest enhanced educational benefits of all 
the services.  Long term effects are seen in the ‘Career Force’ and ‘Accession’ rows.  
According to Hogan and Mackin, a “decline in the reenlistment rate will occur when 
those initial cohorts offered the enhanced benefit are at their first reenlistment point.  In 
the long run, this will result in a decline in the Career Force” and an increase in the 
demand for Accessions.19  By comparing $1,450 Cost Proposal and the Post 9/11 Era GI 
Bill, it is evident that Hogan and Mackin’s proposition seems to have a much smaller 
long term penalty and with a much more modest price tag.   
 
19 The Accession demand will occur about 7–10 years after the implementation of the increased basic 
benefits. 
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To further understand the three different “levels of education benefits”, the costs 
of achieving a “constant force profile” were estimated [See Table 4].  In this comparison, 
Hogan and Mackin wanted “to achieve the increase in high quality recruits generated by 
the Webb proposal, while maintaining the career force levels achieved by the current 
version of the MGIB” (Hogan).  This means they had to: 
 “Determine the cost of using SRBs to buy back20 the decline in the 
reenlistment rate expected under Senator Webb’s proposal” and the $1,450 
Cost Proposal with the current MGIB as the baseline.  (Hogan) 
 Use of “cash enlistment bonuses to increase the number of high quality 
recruits under the MGIB baseline” and the $1,450 Cost Proposal to equal 
the increase under the Webb proposal.  (Hogan) 
In essence, the only factor that changes in the Constant Force Profile is the cost of 
achieving that particular force profile.  All other factors, such as number of high quality 
recruits, the career force and the end strengths are held constant.  These are the SRB 
estimates required to maintain a preferred force level.  A more detailed explanation of 
this table is best stated by Hogan and Mackin.  The explanation is as follows: 
The top row of Table 4 shows the increase in high quality recruits that are 
estimated under the Webb bill, relative to the high quality recruits in the 
baseline MGIB for each Service.  The next row, labeled ‘GI Bill Program 
Cost’, indicates the additional education benefit costs under Webb 
compared to the cost of the benefits under the current MGIB.  The third 
row, labeled ‘Bonus Cost to Offset Career Force Losses’ is the cost of 
‘buying back’ retention losses using the Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
program.  The fourth row, ‘EB [Enhanced Benefit] Cost for Additional 
HQ Accession’, is the cost of using enlistment bonuses to obtain high 
quality recruits.  Note that the additional enlistment bonus costs under 
Webb are zero, because the high quality recruits expected to be produced 
by the Webb bill is the goal high quality number for this force profile.  
The last two rows provide a summary.  The first is the total cost of the 
force profile under Webb.  The second row is the cost per additional high 
quality recruit under Webb. (Hogan) 
 
 
20 Buying Back is synonymous with the SRB required to persuade a First–Term service member to 
reenlist.    
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 Army Navy Air Force 
Marine 
Corps 
Change in HQ Accessions 2,088 1,392 1,912 1,440 
      
Webb Bill     
GI Bill Program Cost Increase $599,079 $446,540 $423,930 $341,099 
Bonus Cost (SRB) to Offset Career 
Force Losses $143,369 $303,850 $241,241 $111,233 
EB Cost for Additional HQ Accession $0 $0 $0 $0 
     
Total Costs ($K) $742,448 $750,390 $665,172 $452,333 
Cost per Additional HQ Accession $355,506 $539,205 $347,930 $314,171 
      
Cost of College Proposal (Case $1,450)     
GI Bill Program Cost Increase $109,669 $113,249 $118,108 $83,558 
Bonus Cost to Offset Career Force 
Losses $44,128 $87,455 $60,290 $34,292 
EB Cost for Additional HQ Accessions $136,904 $83,592 $111,232 $87,438 
     
Total Costs ($K) $290,701 $284,296 $289,629 $205,288 
Cost per Additional HQ Accession $139,196 $204,285 $151,496 $142,585 
      
Current MGIB     
GI Bill Program Cost Increase $0 $0 $0 $0 
Bonus Cost to Offset Career Force 
Losses $0 $0 $0 $0 
EB Cost for Additional HQ Accessions $167,074 $111,333 $152,944 $115,181 
     
Total Costs ($K) $167,074 $111,333 $152,944 $115,181 
Cost per Additional HQ Accession $80,000 $80,000 $80,000 $80,000 
Table 4.   Costs of Producing Specified Force Profile (From Hogan) 
The same analysis is produced for the $1,450 Cost case and the Current MGIB.  
An analysis of this table, with respect to the Webb bill and $1,450 Cost case, shows that 
EB costs are more under $1,450 Cost proposal than under Senator Webb’s bill.  
However, the “buy back” ability (SRB) of the $1,450 Cost proposal is much less than 
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Senator Webb’s bill.  This is due to “less lucrative educational benefits,” which reduce 
the likelihood that individuals will not reenlist to use the enhanced educational benefits 
that the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill offers (Hogan).  The current MGIB is the baseline for the 
career forces; thus, there are no additional costs associated with current SRB levels to 
maintain current force profile.   
To summarize Hogan and Mackin’s report, an across-the-board education 
incentive is a very costly and inefficient policy to increase the number of high quality 
recruits.  Instead, other feasible alternatives, such as additional enlistment/reenlistment 
bonuses or increases in monthly costs (i.e., $1,450 Cost proposal), are much more 
efficient methods to maintain desired career force levels. 
3. Board of Actuaries 
The final segment of this literature review is from the August 2008 Board of 
Actuaries Meeting Minutes involving the Post 9/11 GI Bill Transferability cost 
calculations [as of January 21, 2009].  According to Mr. Brad Ryder,21 the “cost of 
transferability is dependent on administration” of the program22 along with a myriad of 
other unknown elements (August 2008 Board of Actuaries Meeting Minutes).  Mr. 
Ryder’s calculations are problematic because so many factors are unknown; the Board of 
Actuaries has delayed approval of his actual calculations.   
The computations are admittedly complex and theoretical, but attempt to answer a 
simple question: How much should the per capita cost increase so that the per capita cost 
can pay for transferability?  Mr. Ryder’s methodology is based on a Basic Present Value 
(BPV), in which numerous probabilities and expected usage rates will produce a per 
capita cost.  Once the per capita costs are found, they are then discounted to present day 
values, or BPV.  Images of Mr. Ryder’s mathematical model to estimate the different 
costs of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability are as follows: 
 
21 Subject Matter Expert on the “Transferability” costs of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill who works for the 
Board of Actuaries.   
22 Administration of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill is service specific.  Currently, the instruction on the 
administration of the “transferability” is set to be released on June 1, 2009.   
 Figure 3.   Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability Cost Calculations: Part 1 of 2 (From 
August 2008 Board of Actuaries Meeting Minutes) 
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 Figure 4.   Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability Cost Calculations: Part 2 of 2 (From 
August 2008 Board of Actuaries Meeting Minutes) 
Given the time constraints of this thesis and the timeline for Mr. Ryder’s analysis, 
more accurate calculations will not be available until after June 1, 2009.  Additionally, 
Mr. Ryder was unable to provide anymore preliminary estimates due to pending policy 




In conclusion, the saying that ‘need is the mother of all change’ is very much 
applicable to the military, both institutionally and individually.  With difficulties in 
recruiting and retention, the military services had no choice but to change the way they 
do business.  Increasing educational benefits by a substantial amount to maintain the most 
precious resource that the military has, its people, Department of Defense (DoD) is now 
equipped to acquire desired end strength levels.  However, Hogan and Mackin’s 
comparisons show this benefit has different and complex values for different people; 
some stay longer and some leave sooner.  As a result, universally providing an education 
benefit, as proposed in S.22, may do more harm than good in the long run.   
As for individual service members, the skyrocketing costs of college tuition have 
prompted service members and their spouses to make their voices heard by upper echelon 
leadership about educational concerns.  Consequently, this fosters the question, ‘Who is 
most likely to value this benefit highly and who is not’?  Knowing questions like this are 
essential to making fiscally sound policy, decision makers will be able to make 
competent verdicts.   
The DMDC survey cast light on how active duty military members feel about 
education benefits, retention and the new GI Bill usage policies.  Comparing and 
contrasting the DMDC survey and LT Zimmerman’s Enlisted Retention Survey will 
provide much needed information on the matters of non-monetary incentives and the 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism.   
Finally, the estimates provided by Mr. Ryder and the Expanded Army Pilot 
Program will enable simulations that should reveal whether or not the Post 9/11 Era GI 







The methodology in this study is a cost-benefit analysis of the Post 9/11 Era GI 
Bill Transferability Clause utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods.  The four 
mechanisms for administrating GI Bill Transferability closely mimic those used by LT 
Zimmerman’s thesis.  Those mechanisms are Cash Only SRBs, “a purely monetary 
[second price] auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction and the 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  The latter two auctions included 
various non-monetary incentives (NMIs) that appeared to be important to Sailors based 
on prior research as well as survey research conducted as part of this thesis” 
(Zimmerman, 2009).   
A mathematical model of the four auctions was created using Microsoft Excel.  
The model calculated Cash Only SRB requirements, UIP SRB costs, Adjusted SRB 
Values, Total Costs to the Navy and Effective Costs to the Navy (CRAM costs).   
The data obtained from LT Zimmerman’s Enlisted Retention Survey was used to 
estimate the performance of the four retention auctions.  In addition, the survey focused 
on non-monetary incentives and the valuation of those incentives with respect to each 
individual.  Finally, the survey population consisted of Air Traffic Controller (AC) and 
Fire Controlman (FC) ratings in the Navy.  The Appendix contains a copy of the full 
Enlisted Retention Survey.   
B. CASH ONLY SELECTED REENLISTMENT BONUSES 
1. Auction Background Information 
The most straightforward approach to retention bonuses is using purely cash 
bonuses.  The problem with this approach is determining the proper magnitude of the 
monetary incentive.  There are currently two mechanisms to estimate the proper cash 
amount.  The first technique is exogenous predetermination using various models such as 
the ACOL23 model.  This approach can be unreliable, causing the services to over- or 
under-estimate the required bonus.  The other market-based approach is endogenous in 
nature.  This is achieved through “auctions or some other market mechanism” 
(Zimmerman).    
C. AUCTION CHARACTERISTICS 
There are several auction structures, as discussed by Zimmerman and 
described by Figure 5 below.24  Auctions can be open/sequential or 
closed/simultaneous.  In open sequential auctions, the bidders are present 
and the bid is openly and sequentially adjusted until a winner is declared.  
In sealed/simultaneous bid auctions, participants submit a single, private 
(sealed) bid; all bid are revealed simultaneously and a winner declared.  
All participants must be physically or virtually present as the bid is 
adjusted in a sequential auction, which is difficult in a military 
environment considering geographical dispersion and operational tempo 
of the operating forces.  As such, attention will focus on sealed-bid 
auctions (Zimmerman, 2008, 13-15) 
Reverse AuctionsForward Auctions







Figure 5.   Common Auction Variations (From Zimmerman, Introduction to Auction 
Economics) 
                                                 
23 ACOL = A labor economics modeling theory in which individuals compare their projected military 
earnings stream with their possible civilian earnings stream plus their taste for civilian life to determine 
whether to continue military service.  By using this model, planners derive the estimated minimum SRB 
amount that would induce the requisite number of Sailors to stay in the Navy.   
24 This discussion draws heavily from Zimmerman’s (2008) summary of general auction theory and 
for consistency adopts similar conclusions regarding the optimal auction structure.  For completeness but to 
avoid unnecessary duplication, that discussion is merely summarized here. 
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Sealed bid auctions can be further sub-divided into first-price and second-
price sealed-bid auctions.  In a first-price sealed-bid auction the 
transaction occurs at the price submitted by the winning bidder(s).  In a 
second-price sealed-bid (Vickery) auction, the transaction occurs at the 
price submitted by the first excluded or unsuccessful bidder (i.e., the 
“runner-up” bidder).  While first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions 
have different equilibrium bidding strategies, they are likely to produce 
similar results in terms of both the identity of auction winners as well the 
total revenue generated (or cost incurred).  For reasons discussed more 
thoroughly by Zimmerman (2008), this research stream has adopted a 
second-price sealed-bid structure to simulate in this analysis. 
Auctions can be further classified into forward or reverse formats.  
Forward auctions typically involve several buyers and a single seller; 
competition between buyers drives the price higher.  Reverse auctions 
involve several sellers and a single buyer; competition between buyers 
drives the price downward.  In military labor market applications, such as 
this, the format can be characterized as a reverse auction; the military 
services are the single buyer and the service members represent the sellers 
providing military service. 
Finally, auctions can be characterized as single or multiple winner 
auctions.  There is only one item to buy or sell in a single winner auction, 
so there is only one successful bidder.  There are multiple items to buy or 
sell in a multiple winner auction, so there are several successful bidders.  
Typically, force-shaping and force-management auctions are multiple 
winner auctions, with the retained/separated or assigned service members 
representing the winning bidders (Zimmerman, 2008, 13-15) 
Considering these auction structure elements, the auction format discussed in this 
analysis can be characterized as a reverse, second-price sealed-bid auction with multiple 
winners. 
1. Bidding Strategy in a Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction 
The definition of a reverse second-priced auction is best stated when Zimmerman 
writes, “In a reverse auction there is only one buyer (for example, the Navy) and many 
sellers (the Sailors offering their services) who are also the bidders”.  Subsequently, in a 
reverse second-price retention auction, the lowest bidder provides their military service 
but for a price equal to the bid of the “runner-up” or first excluded bidder, who was the 
lowest bidder among those who were not retained. 
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In keeping with Zimmerman’s analysis focusing on second-price auctions, 
understanding the optimal bidding strategy is essential to simulating the cost-
effectiveness of cash SRBs and Non-Monetary Incentives (NMIs).  The optimal bidding 
strategy is best explained by the following passage and Figure 6. 
Under a second-price auction, the optimal bidding strategy is to bid your 
true valuation. For example, if you are bidding (in a forward auction) to 
purchase an item which is worth $30 to you (in other words, you would be 
willing to pay a maximum of $30 for the item), then your best strategy is 
to bid exactly $30 for the item in a second-price auction. 
To understand this result more clearly, this section will illustrate how you 
can never do better than by bidding truthfully in a second-price auction. 
For simplicity, the explanation that follows employs the following 
notation: 
V = Your value for the object 
P = Price paid for the object 
S = Your surplus 
B = Your bid for the object 
H = Highest bid submitted by any other bidder 
The following section will first demonstrate that bidding above your true 
value (i.e., choosing B > V) can only hurt you and then demonstrate that 
bidding below your true value (i.e., choosing B < V) can only hurt you. 
Figure 5 illustrates the three possible cases or outcomes which can result 
from bidding above your true value. Figure 6 illustrates the three possible 
cases or outcomes which can result from bidding below your true value. 
 Figure 6.   Bidding Above Your Valuation (From Zimmerman) 
For all cases, the reader should note that your objective as a bidder is to 
maximize your surplus, S.  If you do not submit the highest bid (i.e., if B < 
H), then S = 0.  If you do submit the highest bid (i.e., if B > H), then P = H 
and your surplus is given by S = V - P = V - H. 
Case A1: H > B > V 
In this case, because H > B, you are not the high bidder and do not win the 
object, therefore S = 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), you also do not win 
the object (because H > V) and therefore would also have S = 0.  Thus, 
bidding above your true value provides no benefit in this case. 
Case A2: B > V > H 
In this case, because B > H, you are the high bidder and win the object, 
therefore S = V - H > 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), however, you also 
win the object (because V > H) and therefore would also have S = V - H.  
Thus, bidding above your true value provides no benefit in this case, 
either. 
Case A3: B > H > V 
In this case, because B > H, you are the high bidder and win the object, 
therefore S = V - H, which is negative, because H > V:  you “win” the 
object, but pay more than it is worth to you.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), 
on the other hand, you would not win the object (because H > V) and 
therefore would have S = 0.  Thus, bidding above your true value hurts 
you in this case.  You would be better off bidding truthfully. 
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 Figure 7.   Bidding Below Your Valuation (From Zimmerman) 
Case B1: H > V > B 
In this case, because H > B, you are not the high bidder and do not win the 
object, therefore S = 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), you also do not win 
the object (because H > V) and therefore would also have S = 0. Bidding 
below your true value provides no benefit in this case. 
Case B2: V > B > H 
In this case, because B > H, you are the high bidder and win the object, 
therefore S = V - H > 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), you also win the 
object (because V > H) and therefore would also have S = V - H.  Thus, 
bidding below your true value provides no benefit in this case. 
Case B3: V > H > B 
In this case, because H > B, you are not the high bidder and do not win the 
object, therefore S = 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), on the other hand, 
you would win the object (because V > H) and therefore would have S = 
V - H, which is positive because V > H.  Thus, bidding below your true 
value hurts you in this case.  You would be better off bidding truthfully. 
This demonstrates that bidding anything other than your true value in a 
second-price auction can only hurt you.  (Zimmerman, 2008, 15-18) 
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In other words, Truthful Revelation25 is the best strategy in a Second-Price 
Auction, and this result holds true for both forward auctions (as specifically illustrated in 
the example above) and reverse auctions (as in any force-shaping or force-management 
scenario).  Moreover, although sailors would be simultaneously bidding on multiple 
incentives (both monetary and non-monetary) in the retention auctions described below, 
truthful revelation of true values remains the optimal strategy. The benefits of being 
truthful in the valuation of NMIs far outweigh the economic risks of trying to lowball or 
inflate one’s bid.  All three mechanisms analyzed here, purely cash SRB, universal 
incentive package and CRAM, will be modeled as second-price sealed-bid auctions. 
D. CASH SRB 
With a purely cash SRB, service members would be asked to specify the 
minimum cash SRB they would require to remain on active duty.  The bids would be 
collected and simultaneously revealed.  The lowest bids would be accepted up to the 
service’s end strength target.  The first excluded bid (i.e., the Nth lowest bid where N-1 is 
the end-strength target) would determine the cash SRB paid to all retained service 
members.  Considering the second-price bidding strategy discussed above, the dominant 
strategy for all service members is to truthfully reveal their minimum acceptable cash 
SRB.  This auction would precisely identify what is essentially the minimum feasible 
cash SRB for the service to meet its end-strength goal. 
E. UNIVERSAL INCENTIVIVE PACKAGE (UIP) AUCTION 
The Universal Incentive Package combines a cash incentive and a common set of 
non-monetary incentives (NMIs) that are offered to all sailors who are reenlistment 
eligible.  This type of incentive is most easily described as a “one-size-fits-all” package 
that has a pre-determined set of NMIs along with a cash bonus.  To attain the desired 
retention goals while staying within budgetary constraints, the cash bonus would be 
expected to be reduced in conjunction with the value of the NMI(s) being offered.  The 
 
25 An experiment designed by Major William J. Norton (“Using an Experimental Approach to 
Improving the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program” [masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007]) 
which is used to determine whether a second price auction design would be truth revealing in a retention 
scenario.  
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allure to this mechanism is “If sailors value these NMIs more than the Navy’s cost to 
provide them, the total value delivered to Sailors exceeds the cost of delivery” 
(Zimmerman).   
With the UIP, “participants would be offered a fixed package of [non-monetary 
retention] incentives and would submit a cash (requirement) bid to supplement that 
package.  The auction would then follow the same process as the monetary-only auction” 
(Zimmerman).  The auction would determine the minimum feasible cash bonus, just as 
with the cash SRB; all service members would receive this new cash bonus and access to 
the NMI(s) included in the UIP. 
F. CRAM 
The final mechanism utilized in this thesis is the Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanism (CRAM), “which combines individualized monetary incentives with 
packages of non-monetary incentives which are similarly ‘customized’ for each 
individual sailor” (Zimmerman). 
The CRAM incorporates three elements, each serving a separate purpose: 
 Second price auction format - Provides accuracy in setting bonus level; 
 Non-monetary incentives - Provide lower cost to retain sailors with value > 
cost for those NMIs; 
 Combinatorial auction - Provides individualized incentive packages with no 
"wasted" incentives.26 
Zimmerman also goes on to state: 
Under the CRAM, a retained Sailor receives a particular NMI only if he 
values the incentive more than it costs the Navy to provide.  This 
eliminates the need to determine which incentives to offer.  All incentives 
are offered to all Sailors and allocated to those whose value exceeds cost.  
For non-monetary incentives whose cost varies significantly depending on 
the number of participants, there are a number of variations of the CRAM 
which can be adopted to accommodate such varying (presumably 
 
26 Peter J. Coughlan, email message to LT Zimmerman, November 2, 2008. 
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increasing) unit cost, including the use of equilibrium prices (where the 
supply or marginal cost curve intersects the demand or value curve), 
average costs, or quantity limits (quotas) for each NMI. 
In other words, using the CRAM is a cost efficient method that will enable the 
Navy to offer retention packages to each sailor that is specific to each sailor so cost 
effectiveness is maximized with respect to each sailor.   
Specifically, the CRAM process works as follows.  All service members are asked 
to specify the minimum cash bonus they would require to remain on active duty.  They 
are then asked to specify the amount by which they would reduce this cash requirement 
for different NMIs or combinations of NMIs; this establishes their value for all potential 
NMIs or NMI combinations.  Each service member is then tentatively allocated the NMI 
or combination of NMIs which maximizes his or her surplus value, where the surplus 
value is the excess of the service member’s value over the service’s cost to provide the 
NMI(s).  In this process the (potential) retention incentive package is individualized for 
each service member, as opposed to the UIP where all service members receive the same 
NMIs. 
The service then determines the effective cost to retain each service member, 
where the cost to retain is (a) the “stand-alone” cash bonus the service member would 
require to retain without any NMIs, (b) minus his/her value of the NMIs in the 
individualized package, (c) plus the cost of the NMIs included in that package.  The 
service retains the least cost service members until reaching their end-strength target; the 
effective cost of the first excluded service member determines the service’s cost for each 
retained service member.  Each retained service member receives an individualized 
package of NMIs plus a cash bonus equal to the effective cost to retain the first excluded 
service member minus the cost of the NMIs in his or her package. Thus, although 
different retained service members may receive different NMIs and different cash 
bonuses, the total cost to the Navy of each retained service member’s retention “package” 
is exactly the same. 
As demonstrated by Zimmerman (2008), the dominant bidding strategy under 
CRAM is for each service member to truthfully reveal their minimum acceptable cash 
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SRB and their true value for all NMIs and combinations of NMIs.  As such, CRAM is 
truth revealing and can precisely determine the minimum retention cost required for the 






                                                
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. TARGET POPULATION 
The Enlisted Retention Survey focuses on two different ratings that are 
considered to be critically undermanned in the Navy.  The reasoning for the targeted 
population as dictated by NPC and best stated by Zimmerman follows: 
The Air Traffic Controller (AC) and Fire Controlman AEGIS (FC AEGIS) 
ratings were selected by the research sponsor based on each community’s 
size and retention challenges.  These groups were chosen by NPC [Navy 
Personnel Command] due to their historical retention challenges.  The 
Department of the Navy indentified these ratings as two of the 20 “most 
undermanned critical skills.”27 (2008, 49-59) 
B. RATING INFORMATION 
The Rating Information section of this chapter provides an overview of the two 
ratings that are in the survey.  Demographic information for each rate (AC and FC) is 
illustrated when Zimmerman writes:    
1. Air Traffic Controller 
Navy Air Traffic Controllers (AC) perform duties similar to civilian air 
traffic controllers and play a key role in the effective use of Naval 
airpower throughout the world in operational and training environments. 
Navy ACs are responsible for safely and effectively directing aircraft 
operating from airfields or the decks of aircraft carriers. They also control 
the movement of aircraft and vehicles on airfield taxiways and issue flight 
instructions to pilots by radio. Standards for entry into the AC field are 
high, but once accepted into the field, Navy ACs enjoy a demanding and 
highly rewarding career. This is a five-year enlistment program.28 
2. Fire Controlman 
Only two Navy job specialties, called "ratings," are included in the 
Advanced Electronics / Computer Field: Electronics Technician (ET) and 
 
27 U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates 
Submission: Justification of Estimates, February 2008, Military Personnel, Navy (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2008), 85. http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/09PRES/MPN_Book.pdf 
(accessed: November 6, 2008). 
28 Michael J. Otten, PERS 4011, email message to the author, November 18, 2008. 
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Fire Controlman (FC). The rating in which an Advanced Electronics / 
Computer Field candidate is trained is determined in the initial phase of 
the Advanced Electronics Technical Core Course in Great Lakes, Ill. 
However, eligibility requirements are the same for both ratings in the 
Advanced Electronics / Computer Field.  
Jobs performed by ETs and FCs are performed throughout the 
Navy's fleet of surface ships including aircraft carriers and Aegis cruisers, 
and at repair activities ashore….  
     FCs operate, maintain and repair the Fire Control Radars, 
mainframe computers, large screen displays, LANS, weapon control 
consoles, automatic gun systems and associated electro-mechanical 
systems utilized in weapons systems. 
     These ratings comprise the basis of the ship's Combat Systems 
department aboard ships and are responsible for maintaining the ship's 
readiness for combat operations.29 (Zimmerman 2008, 49-59) 
Although the AC and FC ratings are varying in terms of duties and shipboard 
functions, they are very similar in obligatory requirements, training intensity and 
relevance to civilian employment opportunities.   
C. POPULATION STATISTICS 
To avoid “reinventing the wheel”, Zimmerman’s explanation of the population 
statistics is ideal for this thesis.  They are as follows: 
There were 2,306 ACs at the time of the survey.  The population was 
20.4% female; with 2,115 E-6 and below; and 29.7% of the rating’s billets 
at sea.  Of the 2038 FC AEGIS personnel, only 6.4% were female.  There 
were 1,733 E-6 and below and 76.7% of these billets at sea.  There were 
4,032 Non-AEGIS FCs in the fleet of which 8.9% were female and 62.7% 
of these billets were at sea.30  The AC and FC ratings provide an excellent 
contrast to each other in terms of the above demographic characteristics. 
Due to the relatively small size and 15% expected response rate, the 
researchers chose to distribute the survey to the entire population 
(including non-AEGIS FCs). 
 
29 Earl Salter, BUPERS–322C, email message to the author, November 6, 2008. 
30 Edward Ferber, ETCM(SW/AW), email message to the author, July 28, 2008. 
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Because of the second-hand nature of contacting the Sailors, a response 
rate was difficult to determine.  Dependent on the number of sailors 
actually contacted, response estimates ranged from 8.6 to 11.5%. 
Although the response rate was relatively low31, there was a fairly 
representative sample.  Table 6 shows a comparison of the population 
versus the sample in key demographics.  Hispanics were considerably over 
represented in the FC (AEGIS) rating.  Air Traffic Controller was under-
represented at sea and Fire Controlman was over-represented. 
(Zimmerman, 2008, 49-59) 
 
  AC FC(non-AEGIS) FC(AEGIS) 
  Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
Female 20.81% 21.62% 8.93% 11.76% 7.50% 11.80%
Black 23.59% 22.27% 10.97% 8.11% 11.45% 12.57%
Hispanic 15.62% 9.55% 1.36% 5.95% 10.62% 10.18%
Under 27 59.66% 57.14% 48.45% 58.82% 46.13% 54.80%
28-42 37.96% 42.38% 47.73% 39.57% 49.83% 42.94%
Over 42 2.38% 0.48% 4.27% 1.60% 4.34% 2.26%
E6 & below 92.11% 97.76% 82.49% 96.79% 85.39% 95.51%
E-5 37.20% 41.70% 34.76% 54.55% 40.43% 51.12%
E-4 & below 30.35% 19.28% 24.39% 17.11% 14.52% 11.80%
At sea 29.29% 19.00% 62.72% 98.26% 72.54% 90.51%
1. FC(NON-AEGIS) significantly under-represented (Hispanic) 
2. Under-representation expected due to targeting of E-6 and below 
3. AC under-represented and FC over-represented (at sea) 
Table 5.  
                                                
 Population and Sample Statistics (From Zimmerman, 2008) 
D. ENLISTED RETENTION SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Distribution of Non-Monetary Incentive Values 
The results of the ERS show that only 604 of 688 completed surveys were usable.  
Missing crucial data forced 84 of the surveys to be deleted from the tabulation of results.  
An explanation of the survey results follows: 
There were 688 completed surveys.  Only 604, however, were usable.  The 
deleted observations were missing crucial data (i.e., reservation values). It 
 
31 Kraus et al., Choice–Based Conjoint Survey, 31. 
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was not possible to infer this data from the other available information.  
Derived numbers were contained in 17 observations.32 
Table 6 lists the average reservation values for a purely monetary 
reenlistment bonus and the dollar amount, of that bonus, the respondents 
indicated they would be willing to give up in exchange for a particular 
incentive [GI Bill Transferability].  The values in column one include 
outliers (initial values in excess of $500,00033) and currently infeasible 
amounts (in excess of $150,00034).  Column 2 excludes outliers and 
Column 3 excludes infeasible requirements.  All usable responses, except 
one,35 were included in the thesis simulations (Zimmerman, 2008, 49-59). 
All Usable Outliers Outliers and 
Responses Excluded Infeasible 
      Exclusions 
Number of 
Observations 603 600 592 
SRB 
Required $66,779  $49,978  $45,539  
GI Bill 
Transferability 6,778 6,814 6,901 
Table 6.  
                                                
 Average Reservation Values for Respondents (After Zimmerman, 2008) 
The following figure illustrates how traditional ways of determining central 
tendencies of the survey results can be misleading in non-normal distributions.  In fact, 
many of the NMIs in the ESR have “large clusters at zero dollars, smaller clusters at 
certain ‘focal’ values and long right-hand tails with few high values” (Zimmerman, 
 
 
32 Of these individuals, 15 indicated that they would reenlist for free (no SRB).  They proceeded, 
however, to indicate a willingness to pay (WTP) a percentage of their SRB for the non–monetary incentives 
listed.  We inferred that they were aware of their eligibility for an SRB and were basing their WTP 
percentages on this amount.  SRB amounts, for calculation of WTP only, were derived from demographic 
information provided.  The Navy’s online SRB calculator 
(https://staynavytools.bol.navy.mil/SRB/Default.aspx) was used. SRB amounts for these individuals were 
entered as zero.  The remaining two individuals indicated that they would require the “current SRB” to 
reenlist.  Their SRB amounts were derived using the above link. 
33 Values above $500,000 seemed to indicate that no amount of money would entice the respondent to 
reenlist.  There were only three responses in this category: $500,000, $1,000,000, and $10,000,000.  These 
observations significantly skew the summary statistics and are considered true outliers. 
34 Although current maximum SRB amount can not exceed $90,000  
(OPNAVINST 1160.8A), the researchers chose $150,000 as a maximum feasibility level to ensure future 
viability of this analysis. 
35 Respondent 623144606’s responses were deleted.  The Sailor’s SRB requirement ($10,000,000) and 
two NMI values ($5,000,000 each) significantly skewed results. 
2008).  The Value Distribution for GI Bill Transferability, as shown below, exemplifies 
how misleading it is to rely on just the mean values alone to characterize such non-
























































Figure 8.   Value Distribution for GI Bill Transferability (From Zimmerman, 2008) 
To better understand the distribution of responses in the ERS, Zimmerman’s 
interpretations of the asymmetric distribution of values in Table 7 provide clarity.  The 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile values [of NMIs] more accurately describe the 
value distribution for each incentive.   
   PERCENTILE   
  10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
SRB 
Required $10,000  $25,000  $45,000  $70,000  $89,000  
GI Bill 
Transferability 0 0 1,000 10,000 20,000 
Table 7.   Reservation Value Percentiles (After Zimmerman, 2008) 
An interesting characteristic that is illustrated in Table 8 is that both the 10th and 
25th percentiles of the distribution of reported values for GI Bill Transferability are equal 
to zero.  In fact, 43% of the respondents in the enlisted survey expressed no value for 
education benefit transferability.   
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E. COST ANALYSIS 
1. Per Capita Cost Calculations of Transferability: Estimates from the 
DoD Board of Actuaries and the United States Army 
The monetary breakdown of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability Clause 
includes numerous costs.  The first cost coincides with the expected spouse/dependent 
education benefits usage rates.  The sample of usage rates and per capita costs is the 
Expanded Army Pilot Program, which was two years in length.  It was also a logical 
approach to see if education transferability was in fact a worthwhile incentive to maintain 
force numbers.  This program was implemented in November 2007.  For active duty 
soldiers and their dependents to participate in this program, they had to meet a set of 
qualifying criteria.   
Soldier’s criteria included: 
 Enrollment in MGIB upon initial entry into the service 
 Completed at least 6 years of service at the time of reenlistment 
 Reenlist for a period of at least 4 years  
 Qualify for a MOS Specific SRB and entitled to a Zone B or Zone C36 bonus at 
the time of reenlistment. 
Eligible dependents include: 
 The spouse of the individual making the transfer 
 One or more of the children of the individual making the transfer; or  
 A combination of the individuals referred above 
After defining the criteria for both active duty members and their dependents, the 
process of enrolling participants began.  To ensure correct processing, participants and 
their career counselors had to be conversant on policy guidance from Director of Military 
Personnel Management (DMPM) and the Army Human Resources Command (AHRC), 
Alexandria, Force Alignment Division.   
 
36 Zone B is for people who are about to move into the 6–10 years of service window where as Zone C 
is for people who are about to move into the 10–14 years of service window.   
 47
                                                
Widely publicizing the pilot program through Commanders Calls37, newspapers 
and Daily Bulletins, retention career counselors were able to canvas as much of the Army 
as possible to ensure that program eligibility, opportunity and participation rates were as 
representative of the Army population as possible.  For soldiers who were in their 
reenlistment window and entitled to a Zone B or Zone C SRB, the Army had to identify 
whether or not the soldiers wanted to participate in the Transferability program.  
Additionally, Soldiers were informed that if they “elect MGIB Transferability, their SRB 
will be reduced in order to fund the actuary per capita cost of transferring benefits” 
(Expanded Army Pilot Program).  The SRB funds that were taken through the SRB 
reduction were placed in the DoD Education Benefit Fund by the Defense Finance 
Accounting Service (DFAS).  The value of the benefit transferred in FY08 was $1,101 
(indexed annually) and only 18 out of 36 months were available for transfer to spouse 
and dependents.  This total entitlement was $19,818.  For soldiers who elected the Army 
College Fund kicker or the $600 per month MGIB Additional Opportunity, their 
expanded benefit (ACF, MGIB, and MGIB Additional Opportunity) was transferred as 
well.  All participating soldiers had to ensure they provided the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (DVA) all pertinent paperwork.    
After gathering participant information for the program’s first year (FY 2008), the 
Board of Actuaries developed the per capita cost for transferability (spouse only).  There 
were a number of assumptions in this estimate, including: 
 a distribution of expected months transferred 
 a distribution of months used in each future year 
 benefit amount ($1,101 per month) 
 CPI38 increases 
 Usage rate 
 an assumed interest rate to discount all of the expected future payments back 
to present day values 
 
37 Daily or weekly gathering of all personnel within a command in which pertinent information from 
upper echelon’s of the Army chain of command are disseminated.   
38 Consumer Price Index. 
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The lump sum total of all known costs and assumed/unknown costs provided the Board 
of Actuaries (BoA) with the per capita transferability cost estimates.39  The FY 2008 per 
capita cost was $2,032 with a usage rate of 12.9%40.  This rate is fairly low compared to 
the results of the program’s second year.  The FY 2009 per capita cost of the Expanded 
Army Pilot Program was $4,508 with a usage rate of 30.0%.  The dramatic increase in the 
program’s second year costs reflects the basic usage rate assumptions and the manner in 
which the Army administered the program to its soldiers.  During the first year, “the 
program was offered to many and chosen by few41” (Ryder).  In contrast, the members 
had to pay to participate in the FY 2009 program, thus increasing the usage rate.  In 
essence, “folks that have to pay money to participate in a program are more than likely to 
end up using it” (Ryder).   
In addition to the BOA estimates, the Army conducted its own analysis of the 
Expanded Pilot Program and determined the cost per participant to be approximately 
$3,100.  This is only a fraction of the potential benefit because not every participant uses 
all 18 months of MGIB transferability.  Also, this reflects a discrepancy between the 
Army and BoA idea of fixed and variable costs and basic assumptions about how the 
program would be received by soldiers and their dependents.   
For the purpose of this thesis, the medium-case cost per person for the 
transferability clause of the post 9/11 Era GI Bill will be $3,100 reflecting the Army cost 
estimate.  The reason for this assumption is that a $3,100 cost per person lies between the 
two extremes provided by the BoA.  The low- and high-cost cases will assume $2,032 
and $4,508 as costs for GI Bill Transferability.42  From Figure 8 above, note that this cost 
range only encompasses a small group of respondents.  Most have lower values for this 
 
39 These per capita costs represent the average annual cost per participant who used the transferability 
benefit.  The annual cost may only represent a fraction of the available benefit. 
40 FY 2008 Transferability Program was open to all soldiers in the Army with no ‘buy–in’.  Since 
participants did not have to purchase the option, the personal value of the benefit was low.  Theoretically, 
the low personal value for GI Bill Transferability translated into a low usage rate.   
41 Approximately 250 participants were in the program.  This is equivalent to about 2% of those 
eligible for the transferability option. 
42  Because these costs are annual costs per user, as opposed to total cost per user they may 
significantly understate the total expected cost per user. 
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benefit; GI Bill Transferability represents an ineffective retention tool for these sailors.  
GI Bill Transferability can represent an effective retention tool for those with values that 
exceed this cost range.  Cost-effectiveness would suggest targeting this benefit to those 
with the highest values, or at least values that exceed the Navy’s cost. 
2. Cash Only SRBs 
The first step for estimating cost-effectiveness to the Navy entails the more 
traditional method of dealing with retention issues; Cash Only SRBs.  Estimating the cash 
only SRBs will establish the base-line for comparing SRB costs with GI Bill 
Transferability.  The desired retention percentages that will be targeted in this section will 
be 25%, 50% and 75% of the survey population.  To attain the retention levels, only SRB 
cash is utilized to determine an individual’s cost of retention as revealed in Zimmerman’s 
ERS data.  The data was sorted in an ascending order so that SRB amounts could be 
determined according to the first excluded value/bid.  This ‘auction’ type technique is 
based on a second-price auction in which individuals actually reveal the SRB cash 
required to reenlist.  Also, four assumptions were included in this analysis.  The 
assumptions are as follows: 
 Sailors specifying $0 SRB will retain for free and do not require any 
additional incentives to remain on active duty. 
 Retention levels of 25%, 50% and 75% are used to illustrate required SRB 
levels to retain potential desired end-strength numbers. 
 All personnel represented by the ERS are eligible for SRBs. 
 No other reenlistment incentives are available to any personnel. 
To better illustrate the Cash Only SRB method, a simple equation will do: 
Retention Cost to the Navy = (SRB Cost of First Excluded Sailor) x (Number of 
Sailors Reenlisted) 
At the 25% retention level, a $30,000 SRB is required to contract the targeted 
enlisted population to reenlist.  If $30,000 is required to retain 25% of this population 
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(151 sailors), $4.53 million is the Navy’s total Retention Cost.43  At the 50% retention 
level, 302 sailors would require $48,000 per person, for a total of $14.5 million in SRB 
payments.  The 75% retention level reveals that the Cash Only SRB costs $72,500 per 
person for 453 sailors in this population; the Navy’s total cost would be $32.8 million.   
3. Cost-Effectiveness for Universal GI Bill Transferability 
The second method of Transferability Cost estimation is organized much like the 
first method where stated SRB values are sorted in an ascending fashion.  The only 
nuance in this method is the sailors’ Value of GI Bill Transferability is deducted from the 
stated SRB required to reenlist.  This represents the Adjusted SRB Cash payment 
required to retain the targeted enlisted population if all sailors are provided GI Bill 
Transferability. 
One complication in this analysis involves sailors stating a $0 value for 
Transferability.  Some of these sailors reported that their required SRB was also zero; 
others required positive cash SRB but were not willing to sacrifice any of this cash 
payment in exchange for GI Bill Transferability.  In either case, some of these sailors 
might still exploit the option if it were offered as part of a universal incentive package.  
Three transferability usage rates are explored in this analysis to reflect these uncertain 
intentions.  The UIP usage will be estimated at the 0%, 50% and 100% level for those 
individuals whose GI Bill Transferability Value is expressed as zero.  The calculations in 
this section will also take into account the estimated cost per person of transferability 
indicated earlier in the text.  The costs per person are $2,032; $3,100; $4,508; low, mid, 
and high cost scenarios, respectively.  The mathematical model for this method is as 
follows: 
Adjusted SRB Cash Payment = (SRB cost) - (Transferability Value) 
Cost to the Navy = (Adjusted SRB Cash Payment for first excluded bid + GI Bill 
Transferability Cost * number of Sailors using the benefit) 
 
43 There are 151 sailors whose SRB value is less than the first excluded value which is the SRB paid 
per person for retention. 
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 The Adjusted Cost to the Navy calculations show how the GI Bill Transferability 
option can affect the Cost to the Navy when it is used as part of a Universal Incentive 
Package.  At 25% retention of the surveyed personnel, only 82 of 151 (54%) personnel 
expressed a positive value for the Transferability of GI Bill.  The remaining 69 (46%) 
sailors expressed no value for GI Bill Transferability.  The Navy is potentially wasting 
money providing this benefit to these sailors because it does not provide any retention 
value, yet they may still use the benefit if offered free of charge.   
The same calculations were completed for the 50% and 75% retention levels.  
These results are summarized below in Table 8.  The Navy’s retention costs include the 
cash SRB (equal to the first excluded Adjusted SRB Cost or the SRB bid minus 
transferability value for the first excluded sailor) and the cost of GI Bill Transferability.  
Table 8 below demonstrates the Navy’s costs associated with the desired retention rates 
(25%, 50% and 75%), the various GI Bill transferability usage rates for those sailors 
expressing no value (0%, 50% and 100%), and the different GI Bill Transferability cost 
estimates ($2,032, $3,100, $4,508).  The Adjusted Cost to the Navy calculations is 
displayed in the following table: 
25% Retention Level (151 Sailors)       
# Using GI X-fer Low ($2,032) Mid ($3,100) High ($4,508) UIP % 
82 $3,488,624 $3,576,200 $3,691,656 0% 
117 $3,559,744 $3,684,700 $3,849,436 50% 
151 $3,628,832 $3,790,100 $4,002,708 100% 
       
50% Retention Level (302 Sailors)     
# Using GI X-fer Low ($2,032) Mid ($3,100) High ($4,508) UIP % 
233 $12,855,456  $13,104,300  $13,432,364  0% 
268 $12,926,576  $13,212,800  $13,590,144  50% 
302 $12,995,664  $13,318,200  $13,743,416  100% 
       
75% Retention Level (453 Sailors)     
# Using GI X-fer Low ($2,032) Mid ($3,100) High ($4,508) UIP % 
384 $27,914,988  $28,325,100  $28,865,772  0% 
419 $27,986,108  $28,433,600  $29,023,552  50% 
453 $28,055,196  $28,539,000  $29,176,824  100% 
Table 8.   Adjusted Cost to the Navy with UIP Estimations 
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4. Cost-Effectiveness of GI Bill Transferability Under CRAM 
The third method of estimating the Cost to the Navy for Transferability is the 
CRAM.  This mechanism only provides GI Bill Transferability to those sailors who value 
the benefit more than the Navy’s expected cost.  Because CRAM is truth-revealing, 
sailors will accurately report their value for GI Bill Transferability in the retention 
auction.  For those sailors expressing a value that exceeds the Navy’s cost of this non-
monetary incentive, their required cash SRB will be provisionally reduced by their value 
minus the Navy’s cost; the cash SRB is not adjusted for sailors not granted GI Bill 
Transferability.  In this case, the effective cost to the Navy is the sailor’s required cash 
SRB (V(srb)) reduced by the sailor’s expressed value for GI Bill Transferability (V(x)) 
plus the cost of GI Bill Transferability for all of those granted that benefit.   
Effective Cost to the Navy = V(srb) - V(x) + (Estimated Cost per Person), 
where V(x) > (Estimated Cost per Person) 
Effective Cost to the Navy = V(srb), 
where V(x) ≤ (Estimated Cost per Person) 
 Under CRAM, sailors are sorted on their Effective Cost to the Navy.  The least 
cost sailors are retained until the Navy meet’s their retention target (25%, 50%, or 75%).  
All retained sailors are paid a cash SRB equal to the Navy’s effective cost for the first 
excluded sailor.  The cash SRB is reduced by the cost of GI Bill Transferability for those 
sailors receiving that non-monetary incentive.  The following assumptions were utilized 
in the analysis for this mechanism: 
 All respondents with SRBs values of $0 were included assuming that these 
individuals would reenlist regardless without any incentive (a $0 value does 
not indicate that there is no payment that could induce retention).  
 Sailors citing the value of GI Bill Transferability as $0, or not expressing a 
value, are assumed to place no value on this benefit. 
 All personnel are eligible for SRBs. 
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 Retention levels of 25%, 50% and 75% are used to illustrate required SRB 
levels to retain desired end-strength numbers. 
After applying the formula to the Enlisted Retention Survey data, the results for 
Effective Cost to the Navy results were sorted in an ascending fashion to reveal an 
Effective Cost for each retention level.  A 25% retention level found the first excluded 
Effective Cost to be $22,000.  The Cost to the Navy [based on the ‘low’ estimated 
transferability cost of $2,032] for this targeted enlisted population is $3.3 million.  Next, 
a 50% retention level shows a $42,032 Effective SRB and the Effective Cost to the Navy 
is $12.7 million.  Finally, a desired retention level of 75% indicates an Effective SRB 
worth $60,000 and an Effective Cost to the Navy of $27.2 million.  Table 9 shows a 
complete breakdown of the low, mid and high estimated Costs to the Navy at the varying 









25% $3,322,000 $3,035,100 $3,247,708 
50% $12,693,664 $12,261,200 $12,686,416 
75% $27,180,000 $27,180,000 $27,180,000 
Table 9.   Effective Cost to the Navy 
Now that all simulations are complete, a comparison of the three different auction 
mechanisms reveal how much cost savings is produced by the CRAM.  At the 25% 
retention level and all three per capita cost estimates, the CRAM clearly outperformed the 
other mechanisms with a minimum of 26.7% in savings.  Additionally, the 50% and 75% 
retention levels of all three per capita cost estimates utilizing the CRAM produced 
savings that ranged from 12.4%-15.4% and 17.2%, respectively.  A detailed breakdown 
of the different GI Bill Transferability cost scenarios and savings possibilities when 
Transferability is used as an NMI is shown in Table 10. 
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    LOW COST ESTIMATE ($2,032)   
Retention Level 25% 50% 75% 
Cash Only Cost $4,530,000 $14,496,000 $32,842,500 
Adjusted Cost 
-UIP 0%- $3,488,624 $12,855,456 $27,914,988 
Adjusted Cost 
-UIP 50%- $3,559,744 $12,926,576 $27,986,108 
Adjusted Cost 
-UIP 100%- $3,628,832 $12,995,664 $28,055,196 
Effective Cost 
-CRAM- $3,322,000 $12,693,664 $27,180,000 
% Savings 
(CRAM vs. CASH) 26.7% 12.4% 17.2% 
        
    MID COST ESTIMATE ($3,100)   
Retention Level 25% 50% 75% 
Cash Only Cost $4,530,000 $14,496,000 $32,842,500 
Adjusted Cost 
-UIP 0%- $3,576,200 $13,104,300 $28,325,100 
Adjusted Cost 
-UIP 50%- $3,684,700 $13,212,800 $28,433,600 
Adjusted Cost 
-UIP 100%- $3,790,100 $13,318,200 $28,539,000 
Effective Cost 
-CRAM- $3,035,100 $12,261,200 $27,180,000 
% Savings 
(CRAM vs CASH) 33.0% 15.4% 17.2% 
        
    HIGH COST ESTIMATE ($4,508)  
Retention Level 25% 50% 75% 
Cash Only Cost $4,530,000 $14,496,000 $32,842,500 
Adjusted Cost 
-UIP 0%- $3,691,656 $13,432,364 $28,865,772 
Adjusted Cost 
-UIP 50%- $3,849,436 $13,590,144 $29,023,552 
Adjusted Cost 
-UIP 100%- $4,002,708 $13,743,416 $29,176,824 
Effective Cost 
-CRAM- $3,247,708 $12,686,416 $27,180,000 
% Savings 
(CRAM vs CASH) 28.3% 12.5% 17.2% 
Table 10.   Auction Mechanism Comparison of Costs to the Navy 
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5. Summary 
The three methods of analysis utilized in this section examine possible avenues of 
using the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability option to aid in retaining skilled sailors 
who are in critically undermanned ratings.  Although method one focuses solely on the 
traditional retention mechanism of Cash Only SRBs, it is shown to be a very cost 
inefficient method to retain high quality sailors.   
In methods two and three, the effect of employing the individuals Value of 
Transferability in conjunction with SRBs seems to be a more practical system in which to 
maximize cost effectiveness in the Navy’s favor.  Adjusted SRBs are shown to be more 
efficient than Cash Only SRBs; however, the problem of UIPs still exists.  To eliminate 
this, Effective SRBs produced by the CRAM are given to sailors who have a Value of 
Transferability greater than the Cost of Transferability.  In other words, UIP costs are 
















V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The goal of this research was to determine the cost-effectiveness of the Post 9/11 
Era GI Bill Transferability clause.  Though cost-effectiveness is impossible to forecast in 
an accurate manner, use of alternative mechanisms such as the CRAM and UIP provide a 
reasonable picture of future cost-effectiveness at various retention levels, based on 
estimated per capita costs.  When compared to each other, CRAM proved to be an 
efficient and flexible mechanism that drastically reduced the Navy’s costs while 
achieving its retention objectives.  
Furthermore, the analysis also revealed that the ROI for an across-the-board 
retention incentive like GI Bill Transferability is not as fruitful as some might hope.  It is 
less effective for retention when offered to all.  However, using GI Bill Transferability as 
an NMI offered only to those who value this benefit the most, in conjunction with 
monetary incentives, has proven to be more efficient than Cash SRBs alone.   
Finally, the determination of whether or not the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill is fiscally 
prudent is the final goal for this research.  The results of the simulations demonstrate that 
the more sailors who use this benefit, the higher the Navy’s cost.  Alternatively, if the 
benefit is only provided for those who value transferability more than its actual cost, then 
providing the benefit to that specific population produces a cost effective means of 
retaining personnel that are in high demand.  In essence, it creates a win-win situation for 
the Navy and for the individual sailor.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Currently, there is ample evidence that a Cash Only SRB is an inefficient method 
to meet retention goals.  Additionally, auction style simulations combining Cash SRBs 
and non-monetary incentives (CRAM) achieve the retention goals while decreasing the 
Navy’s overall cost.  However, providing the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill as an across-the-board 
benefit, as opposed to a targeted non-monetary incentive for select sailors in critically 
undermanned rates, is a less economically attractive retention tool, and possibly very 
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expensive depending on utilization and per capita costs.  The analysis provided by this 
thesis illustrates the need for a new approach to Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability 
policy.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Administration 
The author suggests reclassifying the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill from an educational 
benefit for all military personnel who satisfy current eligibility criterion to a non-
monetary incentive for those who place a value on transferability greater than the per 
capita cost of transferability, particularly for critically undermanned ratings.  
Reclassifying the new GI Bill Transferability option as a non-monetary incentive for 
retention purposes is cost-effective.  Implementing this change incorporates major policy 
and legislation changes at the highest levels of government.   
2. Implementation 
Basic ideas on how to implement transferability as a NMI are as follows: 
 Revamp reenlistment system to one that is a total rewards approach where 
NMIs are combined with cash SRBs.   
 Incorporate CRAM on a small scale, two or three critically undermanned 
ratings, in a pilot program.   
 Have ‘pilot program’ participants purchase GI Bill Transferability at a 
price that is equal to the Cost of Transferability [purchased through an 
SRB reduction, cash payment or monthly allotment from paycheck over a 
pre-determined time period].   
 Track participation rates of sailors who opt for GI Bill Transferability.   
 Track retention rates of sailors and which NMIs were opted for.   
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By revamping the current reenlistment system to a second price combinatorial 
auction system in which NMIs are offered to sailors facing the reenlistment decision who 
value the benefit more than its associated cost, allows participants to truthfully reveal 
how much they value each NMI and which NMIs they want in their respective retention 
package.  Incorporating CRAM with only a couple of ratings allows planners and enlisted 
participants to become comfortable with the program.  It will also allow for proper 
adjustments to any unforeseen situations that may arise.   
Finally, a ‘pilot program’ enables planners and decision makers to see the costs 
and benefits of a total rewards package that coalesces cash SRBs and NMIs.  It also 
provides guidance for future expansion to a Navy-wide pilot program.  Expansion will 
only be viable if essential data, like participation rates and retention rates, are tracked.  
This type of information will be extremely useful in providing direction on how best to 
administer and implement a Navy wide reenlistment program overhaul.   
3. Further Research 
Continued research in the area of GI Bill Transferability as an NMI is essential to 
the overarching research involving the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) goal for the 
Navy to become a Top 50 employer.  For the Navy to achieve this goal, combinatorial 
benefits packages will improve cost-efficiency for funds that are being stretched more 
and more each year.  Even though the data utilized in this thesis was relatively small (604 
observations) and the scope was narrow (E-6 and below Navy ACs and FCs), it provided 
insight as to what might be expected with further research.   
The author suggests conducting a Navy-wide survey much like LT Zimmerman’s 
Enlisted Retention Survey (see Appendix).  The additional information would provide a 
more accurate value distribution of GI Bill Transferability at all Navy pay grades.  
Additionally, the results of such a survey could be used to model similar programs in 
other military services.   
Next, tracking usage rates for GI Bill Transferability in the near future will 
provide more precise transferability cost estimates.  The Board of Actuaries, 
Congressional Budget Office are the leading organizations in cost estimation.   
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Finally, researching retention rates after \ implementing the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill 
will show exactly how much a hike in education benefits affects retention.  In particular, 
the retention rates for individuals who elect GI Bill Transferability will reveal how 























LIST OF REFERENCES 
Callaghan, P (2008 August). The Road to a Better GI Bill. The American Legion 
Magazine, 26-3434. 
 
Carden, M (2009, March 11). Budget Would Transform VA to 21-st Century 
Organization, Shinseki Says.  American Forces Press Service, Retrieved March 
18, 2009, from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53422. 
 
Center for Career Development. (2007). Transfer of Montgomery GI Bill. 
Millington, TN: Commander, Navy Personnel Command. 
 
Congressional Budget Office. (2008). CBO Preliminary Estimates of Costs for S. 22. 
Washington, DC: Peter Orszag. 
 
Congressional Research Service. (2008). A Brief History of Veterans' Education Benefits 
and Their Value. Washington, DC: David Smole. 
 
Cornell University, (2006, January, 2). Transfer of Entitlements to Basic Educational 
Assistance: Members of the Armed Forces with Critical Military Skills. 38 USC 
3020, Retrieved June 4, 2008, from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscprint.html. 
 
Data Center. (Department of Veterans Affairs Evaluation of S.22, 110th Congress: A bill 
to amend Title 38, United States Code 3020, 2008). 
 
Defense Manpower Data Center. 2008 QuickCompass of Active Duty Members, (2008). 
 
Department of the Army. (2006). MGIB Transferability of Benefits to Spouses Army. 
 
———. (2007). Procedures and Guidance Transfer of Montgomery G.I. 
Bill (MGIB) Benefits to Dependents Expanded Army Pilot Program 1 November 
2007. Washington, DC: 
 
Department of Defense. (2008). Response To Honorable Carl Levin, Chairman: 
Committee on Armed Services.  Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates. 
 
———. (2002). Department of Defense Directive. Washington, DC: Paul 
Wolfowitz. 
 
Department of Veterans Affairs: 38 CFR Part 21 RIN2900-AN10: Post 9/11 GI 
Bill. Federal Register. 74, 14654-14687. 
 
 72
———. (2008). The Post 9/11 Veterans Education Assistance 
Act of 2008.  Washington, DC: 
 
DoD - Board of Actuary. (2007). 2007 Signed Minutes. Washington, DC: 
Brad Ryder. 
 
———. (2008). 2008 Signed Minutes. Washington, DC: 
Brad Ryder. 
 
Eisman, D (2009, May, 1). Veterans Can Now Ask For New GI Bill Benefit For College. 




Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget. (2008). Statement 
of Administration Policy: H.R. 2642 -- Supplemental Appropriations Bill of 2008. 
Washington, DC: President George W. Bush. 
 
Hogan, P, & Mackin, P (2008). Recruiting and Retention Implications of Proposed 
Increases in the Montgomery GI Bill Basic Benefit.The Lewin Group. 
 
Houston, Michael (2009 April). Post 9/11 GI Bill Benefits Explanation & FAQs. 
Retrieved June 9, 2009, from Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America Web site: 
http://www.gibill2008.org/benefits.html. 
 
Library of Congress. (2008). Making Appropriations for Military Construction, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, and related. Washington, DC: Representative 
Chet Edwards. 
 
McMichael, W (2008 February 8). Pentagon Starts New Benefits Push. Armytimes.com, 
Retrieved March 4, 2009, from 
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/02/military_payraiseside_080207/. 
 
Philpott, T (2009, May, 2). New GI Bill Transfer Rules Offer More Control. Military 
Update, Retrieved May 5, 2009, from 
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=62422. 
 
Rhode Island Board of Governors For Higher Education. (2008). The Post 9/11 Veterans 
Education Assistance Act of 2008 Background and Historical Information. 
Cranston, RI. 
 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Department of Veterans Affairs Evaluation of S.22, 110th 
Congress: A bill to amend Title 38, United States Code 3020. (2008). In 2008 
Quick Compass of Active Duty  Members Washington, DC: Defense Manpower. 
 
 73
Shea, Carleen (2008). Emily. Pittsburgh, PA: Dorrance Publishing. 
 
Wisnoski, S. (2005). An Analysis of Factors Affecting the Retention Desires of Spouses of 
U.S. Navy Junior Enlisted Personnel. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Zimmerman, B (2008). Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary Reenlistment Incentive 
Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). Monterey, 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 75
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. LCDR Raquel Gladieux 
Office of the Chief of Navy Reserve Training and Education Policy 
Washington, DC 
 
4. Mr. Brad Ryder 
Defense Human Resource Activity/ Office of the Actuary 
Arlington, Virginia 
 
5. Mr. Wayne Wagner 
N1 Strategy Office 
Washington, DC 
